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 1 
The Undead World of Mainstream Economics1 
Ben Fine, Department of Economics, SOAS University of London 
1 
I first put forward the idea of zombieconomics in 2008,2 to reflect two 
fundamental aspects of mainstream economics in appealing to the metaphor 
with the monster genre. One is what I have termed one-dimensions economics;3 
it is not just that it is one-dimensional but it collapses structured determinations 
of economy and society, and their meanings, into a number of single, 
simultaneous dimensions such as the interaction of supply and demand. The 
exact content of this parallel with the flat motives and movements of zombies is 
drawn out in section 2 alongside an account of how this condition came about. 
The second aspect in deployment of the zombie metaphor is the way in which 
mainstream economics has infected not only the study of the economy at the 
expense of other livelier and multi-faceted schools of thought (generally 
gathered under the term heterodox) but has also increasingly extended its 
influence over social science more generally, in what is termed economics 
imperialism.4 This monstrous extension from the economic to the social is 
covered in section 3. In section 4, I offer some observations on how 
zombieconomics has responded to the Global Financial Crisis, GFC, in ways 
that equally reflect the continuing momentum of the zombie genre. 
2 
 
The origins of zombieconomics can be readily traced back to the marginalist 
revolution of the 1870s that heavily consolidated the presence of 
zombieconomic man, otherwise known as homo economicus, characterised by 
self-styled economic rationality. What was ultimately to become 
microeconomics set itself the apparently simple task or technical problem of 
asking what are the maximal restrictions that can be placed on the functional 
forms taken by supply and demand curves (whether for theoretical or empirical 
purposes in estimation) given utility and production functions and optimising 
individuals. Thus, how do supply and demand curves in a market context of 
self-interested individuals depend upon given individual preferences, production 
conditions and available resources. Ultimately, this issue was resolved through 
discovery the “Slutsky-Hicks-Samuelson” conditions. However, this is of lesser 
significance than the process by which the results were obtained and on which 
they depend. This can be described as an “implosion”, as the problem was 
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systematically reduced in ways that allowed it to be solved, throwing out 
whatever qualifications and making whatever assumptions might be necessary. 
 
Crucially, this implosion involved setting up the problem of supply and demand 
in ways in which it could be solved, specifically becoming essential to assume 
that utility is given and fixed, that its maximisation is the sole motive, and that 
goods are essentially defined by their physical properties and have no social 
content as such or in forming and fulfilling the subjectivities and identities of 
consumers.5 Similarly, for production, technology is given and conceived of as 
merely a (narrowly technical) relationship between inputs and outputs. Such 
starting points necessarily preclude many of the issues that not only determine 
supply and demand but also what constitute their very nature.6 
 
Thus began to be created individual zombies who literally serve themselves 
through a utility function for consumption and a production function to provide 
supply to satisfy such consumption of self or others. Taken together, the utility 
and production functions form a “technical apparatus”, the basis on which all 
economic activity (and more) are perceived to function. Individuals pursue self-
interest single-mindedly, with at most a semblance of humanity. Such zombies, 
however, also populate a fantasy world, known as general equilibrium theory, 
which unquestioningly aggregates over individual zombies taken together, each 
subject to the terms of the technical apparatus, to discover a given set of prices 
at which supply and demand will be equal to one another within each and across 
all markets simultaneously. Without going into details, general equilibrium 
theory was propelled by the problem it was seeking to solve, discarding any 
obstacles in the way of seeking out the existence, uniqueness, stability and 
(Pareto) efficiency of such an equilibrium, giving rise to the mainstream’s 
“technical architecture”.7 Ideally, the technical architecture serves to assemble 
together the utility and production functions of the community of zombies, and 
harmonise them through the market system. 
 
Crucially,  over the period of its establishment from the 1870s to the 1950s, the 
technical apparatus, TA, and technical architecture, TA as well – or designated 
together as TA2 for short in what follows – did not enjoy a hegemonic presence 
and influence within the discipline of economics. Indeed, it was subordinate to 
other approaches and, whilst hardly in the underworld, was seen as limited, if 
not inappropriate, in application beyond its own narrow terrain of supply and 
demand and individual behaviour. Most obviously in retrospect is the rise of 
(Keynesian) macroeconomics from the 1930s to become the major complement 
to microeconomics in the post-war period as the two major branches of the 
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discipline. Indeed, the explicit division between microeconomic and 
macroeconomics was first made only in the 1930s, with the rise of 
macroeconomics slightly later but no less rapid and influential than that of 
microeconomics. The latter, significantly, consciously (by Keynes) or otherwise 
(by others), was seen to be totally incapable of dealing with the Great 
Depression, let alone other systemic properties of the economy. Significantly, 
macro and micro co-existed in the 1930s alongside what would now be thought 
of as heterodox economics, especially what has become known as the old 
institutional economics and the more general traditions of inductive economics, 
each of which dovetailed with study of the history of economic thought as well 
as economic history and contemporary social and economic developments. This 
rendered monopolisation, corporate behaviour and organisation, labour 
relations, business cycles, distribution of income and wealth, and so on, subject 
to close attention as opposed to the TA2 world of zombieconomics.8 
 
Coming out of the second world war, there were then three broad fields within 
the discipline – macroeconomics, microeconomics and a mixed bag of applied 
fields. Each of these flourished over the post-war boom. Macroeconomics was 
captured initially by the so-called Keynesian neo-classical synthesis, a simple 
model of the economy made up of two equations, or curves in graphical form 
from the supply and demand for goods and the supply and demand for money. 
This was known as the IS/LM framework (IS for goods, and LM for money), 
familiar to every student in the Keynesian period, and it became heavily 
influenced by the ethos of mathematical modelling attached to microeconomics 
and, thereby, expunging the more radical elements of Keynesianism attached to 
specifying the nature of the financial system and the role of uncertainty for 
example, let alone the concerns and methods of the old institutional economics. 
Nonetheless, the IS/LM framework in principle and in practice retained a degree 
of distance from microeconomics, with some sort of commitment to systemic 
analysis, primarily through close attention to the determinants of 
macroeconomic aggregates and how they interact (consumption, investment, 
demand for money functions, etc). Applied fields tended to forge their own 
independent paths according to their subject matter but they did so in parallel 
with the core division between microeconomics and macroeconomics. 
 
Subsequently with the rise of microeconomics, and its foundations around the 
now-established TA2, fertile conditions were in place for the blundering 
progress of zombieconomics. For, with the acceptance of the microeconomic 
principles attached to TA2, it was at least implicitly recognised that they were 
subject to a tension that can be termed the historical logic of economics 
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imperialism. Initially, or historically, the microeconomic problem was posed as 
addressing the implications of the optimising individual in a market context, to 
explain supply and demand in response to prices leaving aside other motivations 
for individual behaviour and social determinants. However, and this is the logic, 
once the problem was solved and the methods established with credibility as a 
core part of the discipline, it became apparent that the technical apparatus of 
utility and production functions is of universal application without confinement 
to the market and to supply and demand. This pushed for wider applicability of 
the technical apparatus, with success contingent upon increasing acceptability 
within economics itself and, for greater influence, in other disciplines that could 
be hostile to the encroachment of economics on his traditional subject matters 
through use of alien methods, concepts and theories. In other words, utility and 
production functions as the way to understand demand and supply, pursuit of 
self-interest, and the imperatives of efficiency became seen as the means to 
understand more or less everything, especially by economists but whoever else 
could be persuaded. 
 
In short, whilst the creation of the monstrous reduction of the economic to TA2 
involved an implosion around the narrowest of conceptions, it lay the basis for a 
subsequent explosion of those principles. However, protection against such an 
expansion was, in the first instance, offered to some degree by the co-existence 
with microeconomics of (Keynesian) macroeconomics and applied fields. 
Nonetheless, these were still influenced by the ethos of microeconomics, 
especially its development of deterministic mathematical modelling as the 
standard of rigour and science (as opposed to realism of assumptions) and the 
pre-occupation with equilibrium and efficiency. 
 
For macroeconomics in particular, first is its dependence upon an unchanging, 
unique, efficient, long-run equilibrium around which analysis focused on paths 
of adjustment to, or around, that given equilibrium. Second, and more broadly is 
to have drawn a firewall of independence between short and long runs, 
conflating the different ways of understanding these as if they were all the 
same: namely, being in equilibrium or not; the passage of time; and the relative 
speed of adjustment of variables (itself subject to theoretical and empirical 
dispute, not least between Keynesians and monetarists over quantity and price 
adjustment). Only through this conflation was it possible to allow for short-run 
adjustment without long-run effects (for a recession, for example, surely 
reduces the levels of investment, and hence available resources, upon which the 
equilibrium rests). Third is the facile treatment of money as both fixed, or 
fixable, in supply, but also subject to equilibrium with demand as opposed to 
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being part and parcel of a financial system that is more or less effective in 
mobilising and allocating resources for investment.9 Last, the contribution that 
might be made by applied fields to the understanding of macroeconomic 
performance is simply side-lined, either as irrelevant or as belonging to an 
exogenously given long run. This includes considerations of monopolisation, 
labour relations, technical change, and business cycles as part and parcel of the 
growth process (for example, there is no way that Schumpeter’s creative 
destruction could fit across the macro/micro divide). 
 
Indicative of these developments is the rise of mainstream growth theory, with 
the Solow growth model of 1956. It represents the separation of growth theory 
from macroeconomics. And it continues to remain unclear whether growth 
theory is a part of macroeconomics or microeconomics because the technical 
apparatus of microeconomics, specifically the production function, underpinned 
what is a macroeconomic issue, long-term performance. 
 
In short, the relations across microeconomics, macroeconomics and other 
applied fields were certainly not fixed nor without flaws but they did constitute 
a compromise around methods to be used and responsibility for subject matter 
even if with fluid boundaries. This compromise was rudely shattered by the 
demise of the post-war boom, the credibility of Keynesianism, and the 
monetarist counter-revolution, spearheaded by Milton Friedman and taken to 
extremes by what became known as the New Classical Economics, NCE, that 
emerged in the late 1970s. Through the vertical Phillips Curve, Friedman 
argued that the state could only stimulate economic activity (and reduce 
unemployment) at the expense of ever-accelerating inflation. By contrast, by 
assuming the presence of hype-rational individuals, optimising the use of 
information unlike those of Friedman,10 the NCE denied even the minimal role 
that Friedman allowed the state in its ability to affect unemployment albeit at 
the expense of an ever accelerating/decelerating price level. 
 
The state ineffectiveness result involves the culmination of the factors 
previously identified, not least the presumption that there are some 
(dogmatically privileged) irreducible fundamentals such as resources, 
preferences and technologies from which all else derives, and their location 
within an extreme set of assumptions, and hence, consequences, not least 
representative individuals, perfectly working markets, rational expectations and 
state ineffectiveness. Notable is that this follows less from the nature of the 
theory itself (although this is essential) than from the way in which the state is 
itself conceptualised. Given long-run equilibrium, representative individuals 
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with given utility and production functions, where there is no health, education, 
welfare or industrial policy, no conflict over the distribution of income, and so 
on, the state is reduced to an individual with some special powers to shift supply 
and demand. It is hardly surprising given the powers of individuals in 
conditions of perfectly working markets that such a reduced state should be 
powerless. The state is only enabled to do what individuals can neutralise. 
 
In a world of zombie-like individuals, with nothing other than a perfectly 
working market to coordinate them, a zombie-like state is best suited to meet 
their purposes. Effectively, then, the NCE reduced macroeconomics to the 
consequences of monetary shocks, with reliance upon single representatives of 
zombie and victim for ease of exposition and analysis – never mind the lack of 
realism that one individual can only survive at the expense of the other. The 
NCE was soon complemented by real business cycle, RBC, theory in which 
fluctuations in the economy are perceived to be the consequence of shocks in 
the rate of productivity increase, relieving the analysis of the need to consider 
monetary factors altogether. Unemployment amongst zombies is entirely a 
matter of voluntary choice, increasing and decreasing in line with more or less 
randomly generated flesh-eating opportunities. Further, taken together, NCE 
and RBC theory were complemented by the efficient market hypothesis, EMH, 
for financial markets to form a troika around which not only should state 
intervention be minimised but in which the free operation of financial markets 
could also provide for the best of worlds. 
 
This troika, then, constructed a zombie world populated with zombie 
individuals and a corresponding set of zombie economists. Crucially, this is a 
world considerably removed from the one that prevailed in the Keynesian 
mainstream of the post-war boom even though there are many elements of 
continuity. This is so much so that even those who played some considerable 
role in this evolution seem aghast at what has been (or they have in part) 
created, if mistaking zombie for madman. For Solow:11 
 
Suppose someone sits down where you are sitting right now and 
announces to me that he is Napoleon Bonaparte. The last thing I want to 
do with him is to get involved in a technical discussion on cavalry tactics 
at the Battle of Austerlitz. If I do that, I’m getting tacitly drawn into the 
game that he is Napoleon Bonaparte. 
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 7 
Even Milton Friedman lost patience with the developments in economics that he 
had done so much to spawn, bemoaning the discipline had become “an arcane 
branch of mathematics”. 
Usually omitted from the oft-quoted Solow is how he continues from above: 
Now, Bob Lucas and Tom Sargent12 like nothing better than to get drawn 
into technical discussions, because then you have tacitly gone along with 
their fundamental assumptions; your attention is attracted away from the 
basic weakness of the whole story. Since I find that fundamental 
framework ludicrous, I respond by treating it as ludicrous – that is, by 
laughing at it – so as not to fall into the trap of taking it seriously and 
passing on to matters of technique. 
Unfortunately, though, you can only afford to laugh at zombies and ignore them 
when they are either powerless or you have already established your reputation. 
Inevitably, as critical point of departure, those following in the wake of the 
monetarist counter-revolution felt compelled to take it seriously, and did so in a 
way in which the zombie genre did itself evolve. 
 
For, from the horrors in which the compulsion is to escape or to kill, zombies 
have become the target of well-meaning or mad scientists, allowing for parallel 
storylines, respectively, in which they can be calmed, even cured, to restore 
semblances of their humanity, or they inevitably revert to type despite these 
futile attentions.13 In the genre of mainstream economics, zombies were to be 
cured and accommodated by acknowledging that their spontaneous behaviour is 
far from efficient and needs to be galvanised in light of market imperfections, 
not least that zombies have imperfect information about where they might find 
flesh and maybe they should cooperate and share in searching it out and 
consuming it. 
 
Within mainstream economics, this provided the basis for the new 
Keynesianism, which believes that the world of zombies is not only well 
understood but that it can be subject to effective control. As a striking 
illustration of the mad if well-meaning scientist of the economy, consider Oliver 
Blanchard, erstwhile Chief Economist at the IMF. For Blanchard (2008), a 
working paper with presumably relatively limited delay to publication, he 
suggests, emphasis added: 
 
For a long while after the explosion of macroeconomics in the 1970s, the 
field looked like a battlefield. Over time however, largely because facts 
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 8 
do not go away, a largely shared vision both of fluctuations and of 
methodology has emerged. Not everything is fine. Like all revolutions, 
this one has come with the destruction of some knowledge, and suffers 
from extremism and herding. None of this deadly however (sic). The 
state of macro is good. 
 
Just a short time later, Blanchard had entirely changed his tune). Effectively five 
“confessions” were made of the mea culpa variety, in explaining how the state 
of macro was no longer good, that: low inflation should be a primary target of 
policy; this could be achieved through the single instrument of the interest rate; 
fiscal policy was of limited significance; financial regulation was not a 
macroeconomic matter; and, with the Great Moderation (the period of what was 
presumed to be absence of crisis from the mid-1980s), continued stability was 
more or less guaranteed. 
 
Effectively, within its vision of relatively mild market imperfections, 
confidence in macro meant we can control the zombies in our fantasy zombie 
world, giving rise to the most diluted form of an already diluted Keynesianism 
known as the New Consensus Macroeconomics, NCM, leading to Blanchard’s 
assessment that the state of macro is good. Significantly, the NCM accepts as 
much, if not more, of the NCE than it rejects. It retains rational expectations, 
representative individuals and micro-foundations. Where it departs is in merely 
allowing for some markets to be inefficient in the limited sense of not clearing 
instantaneously, some zombies cannot find the flesh they want even though it is 
out there. The result is that government policy can be effective in a limited way 
through interest rate manipulation, reflating or deflating the economy by 
shifting it. This does, however, build inflationary inertia into the system, and 
higher interest rates will be needed to reduce inflation, inflationary expectations 
and expectations (or credibility) of government. 
 
The theory was rudely shattered by the GFC, and the policy perspective by the 
failings of Quantitative Easing, given that the lowering of interest rates to 
minimal levels did not induce zombies to have enough confidence to invest in 
flesh-seeking activity. With the exception of some marginal developments, see 
below, this completes our review of how zombieconomics got where it is as far 
as macroeconomics on the cusp of, and beyond, the crisis is concerned. It has 
been subject to: a division between macroeconomics and microeconomics (with 
a correspondingly separate terrain for an increasingly marginalised applied 
economics as it became reduced to microeconomics); a reduction of 
microeconomics to TA2; the separation of short and long runs; subordination of 
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 9 
macroeconomics to microeconomics; the driving of macroeconomics to 
extremes by rational expectations, perfectly working markets and representative 
individuals, reducing the conceptualisation and the effectiveness of the state 
with that conceptualisation; and offering the mildest of reactions against these 
extremes with the entirely ineffective NCM once the Great Moderation gave 




The overwhelming weight of the zombie genre rests on an appetite for human 
flesh and infection of the human victim; other than humorous asides, and 
leaving zombie-like vegetarian triffids, animals as targets for consumption do 
not tend to figure. In this respect, mainstream economics has got ahead of the 
genre, gorging itself not only within its own discipline but also across others as 
well in pursuit of economics imperialism. 
  
More specifically, in what is termed the first phase of, or old, economics 
imperialism, especially associated with Gary Becker, the TA2 principles are 
applied outside the market but as if a market is present. Prior to the demise of 
Keynesianism, this offered three notable successes – cliometrics (the new 
economic history), public choice theory (politics as horse trading subject to 
costs and benefits), and human capital theory (education and skills as if reduced 
to an investment). However, with the monetarist counter-revolution and the 
subordination of macroeconomics to microeconomics, economics imperialism 
enjoyed greater leeway, not least engaging fields within economics itself, most 
notably macroeconomics. 
 
Paradoxically, the greatest impetus to a second phase of, or new, economics 
imperialism derived from a reaction against the analytical thrust of the first in 
its reliance upon perfectly working markets. In part, this was motivated by the 
wish to restore Keynesianism through rejecting the instantaneous market 
clearing attached to the NCE. In doing so, reliance was placed on explaining 
inefficient, sticky or absent markets through microeconomic principles by 
setting aside perfectly available information for all for asymmetric information 
on one or other side of the acts of exchange, with Akerlof’s market for lemons 
the paradigmatic exemplar.14 Thus, non-market factors, those underpinning 
supply and demand such as institutions, became amenable to analysis in the 
more palatable form (to some economists and to non-economists alike) as the 
response to market imperfections as opposed to being seen as simply the 
reflection of as if market perfection in the absence of the market (horse-trading 
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in politics for example). The result was to induce a whole new range of fields 
extending economic analysis to the non-economic, revitalising those fields 
previously subject to the old economics imperialism. Most of the disparate 
fields, dubbed applied economics earlier, came under the sway of 
microeconomics, with mathematical models and econometrics displacing 
inductive methods and content. 
 
Six aspects of the second phase of economics imperialism are worth 
highlighting over and above its scale and scope of subject matter and 
disciplinary coverage. First is that the marriage of TA2 with concepts from the 
traditions, methods and theories of the other social sciences is inevitably, 
despite being primarily on the terms of economics, conducive to inconsistency 
if not incoherence. Generally, for example, enriched content could be offered in 
the motivation underpinning individual behaviour, if at the expense of raising 
questions over where each form of behaviour begins and ends, and the use of 
social categories, such as gender, race or class begs the question of how these 
are compatible with methodological individualism. Just where does the zombie 
end and the human begin? 
 
Thus, economics has now become subject to what can be termed “suspension”, 
like zombies between life and death, prioritising its TA2 more or less 
unquestioningly but being prepared more or less arbitrarily to set it aside as the 
determinant of behaviour in deference to other explanatory factors. 
Significantly, both the confidence with TA2 and the timing of the inclination to 
complement it with other factors is highlighted by the commentary of Herbert 
Simon (1999, p. 113) who suggests of the 1930s that he offered economics two 
gifts, “organizational identification” and “bounded rationality”. He bemoans 
that, “The gifts were not received with enthusiasm. Most economists did not see 
their relevance to anything they were doing, and they mostly ignored them and 
went on counting the angels on the heads of neoclassical pins”. Similarly, 
despite being developed by mainstream economists soon after the second world 
war, game theory was only heavily integrated into mainstream economics once 
its potential (suspended) inconsistencies with individualism could be 
overlooked – the need, in light of conjectural variation, to take a view of other 
players’ world views and vice-versa so that preferences and actions are 
inevitably interdependent and certainly not conducive to single equilibrium. In 
short, game theory and behavioural economics have attained a particularly 
strong presence within the mainstream as they allow for an almost unlimited 
scope and are conducive to policy analysis that is far more rounded than that 
relying upon TA2 alone. 
This is the draft English translation of Fine, Ben (2017) Die untote Welt der Mainstream-Ökonomik Zeitschrift 
für Kulturwissenschaften Vol 11 (2), 85-102. Published version available from De Gruyter 
[transcript]:  https://doi.org/10.14361/zfk-2017-0208 




Second, such promiscuity in the promotion and suspension of its own economic 
principles has developed to such an extent that it can be considered a third or 
newest phase of economics imperialism, in which the basic principles have been 
more or less discarded altogether leaving behind a shell of mathematical 
modelling and econometric estimation. This has led the leading exponent of 
critical realism, Tony Lawson (2013), to argue that there is no such thing as 
neoclassical economics (in part by reference to how Veblen defined it which is 
hardly relevant to the present day) and to characterise (the deficiencies of) the 
mainstream in terms of its being reduced simply to reliance upon deterministic 
mathematical models in search of empirical regularities (and corresponding 
social ontology). This is, however, to overlook that the principles of the 
mainstream, organised around TA2, have been far from absolutely suspended 
and continue to lie at the centre of and inform the vast majority of teaching and, 
if less so given the novelty of suspensions, research within the discipline. In the 
event, the character of the third phase of economics imperialism is well 
captured by the terminology of “freakonomics” and “the economics of almost 
everything”. Unbelievably, the term freakonomics was coined by the 
discipline’s own practitioners to indicate that it was capable of analysing 
whatever it liked 
 
Third, this latest phase of economics imperialism gives rise to an extraordinary 
extension of scope of the application of the discipline’s principles outside of its 
traditional subject matter but in ways which are fragmented and incoherent. 
There is simply a proliferation of fields and analyses with little or no unifying 
frame of analysis, connecting them to one another, other than (suspended) 
commitment to TA2 as well as contingent ideological predilections in favour of 
the market. With a starting point in TA2, and the determinants of supply and 
demand upon the market, economics has reached out to the world beyond these 
in a big bang of filling out the rest of the universe. Such anarchy is reflected, for 
example, in the simultaneous development of the new institutional economics 
and the application of social capital within economics, each of which has 
separate intellectual origins, but each of which performs the same function of 
accounting for the non-economic’s impact upon the economy. Yet, these two 
literatures sit side-by-side with little or no interaction between them, as in the 
work of Nobel Prize winner, Elinor Ostrom, Fine (2010). And, in addition, the 
social capital and rent-seeking literatures incorporate exactly the same analytical 
frameworks whilst drawing entirely opposite conclusions concerning the impact 
of the non-economic upon the economic, Fine (2010b). Thus, like zombies who 
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remain alive however much they are damaged, the different fields of economics 
imperialism share origins but are otherwise marked by their arbitrariness. 
 
Fourth, this is all indicative of what has been termed bringing back in, BBI. As 
outlined, the TA2 was established by an implosion, the systematic exclusion of 
any factor, method, realism or even narrow technical assumption that stood in 
its way. Economics imperialism’s big bang has ultimately seen that implosion 
reversed, with TA2 exploding within the discipline and across other disciplines. 
Although there tend to be no go areas, most notably those social sciences in the 
wake of postmodernism engaging in the meaning of economic and social 
activity, ethnography and so on (and especially, in this light, the world of 
consumption within the other social sciences which is not reducible to fixed 
utilities/identities and symbolic content of goods), BBI is quintessentially the 
inconsistent/incoherent form taken by the suspended character of economics 
imperialism. This is precisely and perversely because TA2 could only be 
established by precluding the content which is now brought back in to be 
explained or to be used as explanatory variable (thereby subsequently allowing 
for what essentially undermines the starting point). 
 
Fifth, this is indicative of both the strengths and the weaknesses of the 
mainstream. The intellectual, institutionalised strengths lie in the unquestioned 
commitment to TA2 even though it is subject to a suspension that might have 
led it to be challenged in earlier times (through bounded rationality and/or game 
theory, for example, that are now allowable). The weaknesses are twofold. On 
the one hand, it is accepted that the discipline’s core principles are incapable of 
explaining the economy let alone broader issues and, so, it is necessary to range 
beyond those principles to include an unspecified and unspecifiable set of non-
economic variables and analyses. On the other hand, the corresponding 
explosion across the other social sciences to explain the economy let alone the 
non-economic (as economics imperialism) exposes the discipline to alternative 
methodologies, methods, theories and conceptualisations with which it is 
entirely incompatible and both outdated and extreme, as is evidenced for 
example in its reliance upon methodological individualism, empiricism, 
deductivism and so on. Zombies too have their strength of indestructibility but 
are profoundly weak in their capacities for survival against superior 
capabalities! 
 
Sixth, at least intellectually, this explains the absolute intolerance of the 
mainstream not only for alternative approaches but also to fields such as the 
history of economic thought and the methodology of economics. So 
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intellectually fragile is the mainstream to alternatives that it can only prosper by 
marginalising and failing to engage with them other than on its own narrow 
terms, if bolstered by suspension and BBI. Indeed, this is rationalised by 
stigmatising heterodox economics for lacking the supposed scientific rigour 
associated with the mainstream’s theoretical and empirical methods, even 
though these border on the inconsistent and incoherent and are from the borders 




The purpose of this wide-ranging overview of the discipline in a broader context 
is to explain why the mainstream has proven incapable not so much to explain 
the GFC, and to offer policy to move beyond it, but even to be able to respond 
to this lack of capacity itself. Zombies have limitations whatever the extent to 
which they are experimented with. In this, economics is not necessarily lacking 
in scope of analysis, given the pervasive reach of economics imperialism, nor 
even, as most would suppose, the deadweight path dependence of what was 
previously thought to be the good state of macro. Rather, the problem lies both 
in how the discipline broaches broader material and in how this precludes 
moving forward to alternative analyses other than in a marginal way. It is a 
consequence of suspended TA2 as the content and form taken by the latest phase 
of economics imperialism. It is only able to offer fragmented and inadequate 
analyses whilst offering the illusion of being capable of including more or less 
anything at will. 
 
This syndrome is ideally illustrated by reference to where the mainstream will 
not go, to heterodox political economy. More specifically, especially in the 
wake of the GFC, the notion of financialisation has over little more than a 
decade mushroomed across the social sciences, incorporating an extremely wide 
range of disciplines, methodologies, methods, theories, conceptualisations and 
subject matter, often from what is acknowledged to be undue neglect of finance 
in the past. Particularly striking is the failure of mainstream economics to have 
participated in this academic venture in any way whatsoever. Nor is it difficult 
to discern why, in contrast to other buzzwords and fuzzwords concepts such as 
globalisation and social capital, in which it has been able to participate from its 
own perspectives. The obstacles to embracing financialisation are that it is 
systemic, involving structures, relations, processes and agencies, and conflict 
and power. Both individually, and especially collectively, these are anathema 
even to the most open and suspended forms of economics imperialism – 
financialisation as behavioural economics, I don’t think so! 
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But, equally important, as signalled earlier, even if sharply revealed by the GFC 
as the most explicit form taken by its inadequacies, the nature of mainstream 
economics that renders it incapable of addressing financialisation hangs heavily 
over the treatment of other issues that it either neglects or impoverishes, 
whether it be technical change, distribution, monopolisation, the role of health 
and education in economic performance, and so on. As argued, it is not at all 
that these are not covered but that they are only so on the basis of a piecemeal, 
fragmented and suspended TA2 which, paradoxically, continues to provide 
considerable innovative momentum to the discipline and the marginalisation of 
alternatives whether the latter be within heterodox political economy or through 
genuine interdisciplinarity with the other social sciences. 
 
This is truly a bleak picture and draws a sharp contrast with the previous major 
crises of the 1930s and the 1970s, when Keynesianism and the monetarist 
counter-revolution marked major changes in the discipline. By contrast, it seems 
today relatively undisturbed, changing rapidly if only to remain the same given 
the shifting forms taken by the latest phase of economics imperialism. Indeed, 
in earlier work, Fourcade (2010) has suggested that the scope for heterodox 
economics and its influence upon policymaking is highly contingent upon 
country context. Somewhat later, however, she has felt obliged to tease out what 
constitutes the supposed superiority of economists and how they sustain it, 
Fourcade et al (2015). This has, however, strengthened and broadened over 
time, with one of her exceptional cases, France, seemingly falling in line with 
the mainstream.15 The one exception, that more than proves the rule, seems to 
be Greece where the Syriza Government has been flush with powerless 
professors of heterodox economics. Possibly, this signals that the only secure 
way to bring about an alternative economics alongside, let alone in place of, the 
mainstream is through an equally radical change in policies, itself contingent on 
strengthening the political forces favouring them. 
 
Footnotes
1 In a slightly shorter version, Fine (2017), this article first appeared in German. 
2 See Fine (2008 and 2009). 
3 Marking 50 years since publication of Marcuse’s classic, One-Dimensional Man, Fine 
(2016). 
4 For its own practitioners, see Lazear (2000), and Fine and Milonakis (2009) and Milonakis 
and Fine (2009) for its specification and evolution in detail. 
5 This implies an entirely different individual subjectivity for mainstream economics (it is 
fixed) than for the postmodernist inventive consumer. 
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6 In addition, merely allowing for optimisation to be achieved required further technical 
assumptions to be made, such as diminishing returns to scale. 
7 The terms derive from Al-Jazaeri (2008). 
8 Note that Lionel Robbins’ infamous definition of economics in the early 1930s as the study 
of the allocation of scarce resources between competing ends served more to anticipate and 
promote the zombieconomics that was to come than to reflect on the contemporaneous state 
of the discipline. 
9 It is noteworthy that the mainstream is essentially incapable of explaining why money 
emerges let alone why it would continue to be needed once equilibrium is attained. 
10 Rational were substituted for adaptive expectations. 
11 Cited in Klamer (1984, p. 146). 
12 These are the extreme monetarists, representative of the NCE. 
13 Most notably in the BBC’s “In the Flesh” which neatly plays on the uncertainties between 
the two trajectories. 
14 For the new economics imperialism as Kuhnian paradigm, see Fine (2004) and, in the 
context of the development economics, Fine (2002). 
15 See http://assoeconomiepolitique.org/petition-pluralism-now/ See also Heise and Thieme 
(2015) for the earlier history of the decline of German heterodox political economy if, to 
some extent, falling into blaming the victim. See Lee (2012) for a more general defence of 
heterodoxy against critics of its being responsible for its own fate. 
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